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The proportion of students enrolled in private  secondary schools in developing countries stems
rather than public schools varies greatly among  from limited public spending, which creates an
countries. James tries to explain (1) the system-  excess demand from people who would prefer to
atically higher proportion of enrollment in  use the public schools but are involuntarily
private schools in developing than in developed  excluded and pushed into the private sector.
countries, at the secondary level, and (2) the
seemingly random variation across countries  Limited public spending on secondary
within a given level of education and stage of  education, in turn, is modeled as a collective
development.  decision which is strongly influenced by the
numerous families that opt for many children,
She argues that differentiated demand and  and that consequently can only afford to invest
nonprofit supply - both of which stem from  small amounts in each child, in developing
cultual  heterogeneity, especially religious  countries.
heterogeneity - are the major explanations for
variations in the proportion of private education  The results of regressions that determine
within a given stage of developmuent  and educa-  private-sector size recursively and simulta-
tional level.  neously with public educational spending are
consistent with these hypotheses.
By contrast, she hypothesizes that the
proportionately heavy enrollment in private
The  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of work  under  way  in  the  Bank.  An  objective  of the  series
is to get these findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fully  polished. The findigs,  interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
Produced  by the Policy  Research  Dissemination  CenterWhy Is There Proportionately  More Enrollment
in Private  Schools in Some Countries?
by
Estelle James
Estelle James  is Senior  Economist,  World  Bank, and  Professor  of Economics,
SUNY, Stony Brook. The author wishes to thank the numerous  people in the U.S.
and abroad who helped her with the study that has been partially summarized  in
this  paper.  She especially  appreciates  the typing  and related  work  by Suzanne
Lane and the data  analysis by Renqui Xiao, H. K. Lee, Amy Salsbury, and Johan
van  der  Sluis.  Financial  support  received  from the  Spencer  Foundation,  the
Exxon Foundation,  the Agency for International  Development, and the Program
on  Nonprofit  Organizations  at  Yale University  is  gratefully  acknowledged.
Anonymous referees also made very helpful comments in connection with earlier
versions.Table of Contents
I.  Conceptual Framework  3
Basic Model  3
Key Variables in the Private Sector Equation  8
Collective Choice about EDSP  11
H1.  Empirical Results  13
Methodology  13
Determination of %PVT  in a Recursive Model  14
Determination  of Public Educational Spending  16
Simultaneous versus Recursive Determination of EDSP and
%PVT  18




Appendix A: Symbols and Data Sources  30
Bibliography  33Impure public goods such as education  yield both public and private
benefits  and  hence  can  be financed  through  the  public  or private  sectors. Even
when government  funding  predominates,  production  can be carried out through
public  or  private  management.  Thus,  different  combinations  of  public  and  private
provision  (funding  and  management)  are feasible  and are, in fact,  observed  in
different  countries.  For  example,  the  percentage  of  enrollments  that  are  private
at the  primary  and  secondary  levels  covers  the  entire  spectrum  from  1% to 1001,
as shown in Table 1.  At higher  educational  levels  the dispersion  is also
substantial.
What demand and supply factors account for these differences  across
societies? How does  the  process  of economic  development  affect  the  role  of the
private  sector  in education? To what degree  can  government  policies  influerce
the outcome?  This paper investigates  these  closely related  questions.  The
answers  are important  since  private  schools  may  differ  from  public  schools  with
respect  to cost  and quality  and  a system  that is largely  prlvate  may  provide  a
different  educational  service  and  distribution  from  one  that  is  largely  public.
More specifically,  I  seek to explain (1) the systematically  higher
proportion  of secondary  school  private  enrollments  (X PVT) in developing  as
compared  with developed  countries  (mean  - 31.32  for  developing  versus  21.4Z  for
developed  countries  in  my sample);  and  (2)  the  seemingly  random  variation  across
countries  within  a given  level  of education  and stage  of development.
I hypothesize  that the  large  Z  PVT at the  secondary  level  in developing
countries  is due to limited  public  spending,  which creates  an "exceses  demand"
from  people  who  would  prefer  to  use  the  public  schools  but  are  unable  to find  a- 2 -
place.  The  low public spending  on secondary education is modelled as a
collective  decision  which  is  strongly  influenced  by  a  coalition  of high  income,
high tax families  and low income  families  who have opted for quantity  over
quality  of  children,  in  developing  countries. This "excess  demand"  explanation
helps resolve  a seening  anomaly:  why the private  sector  has grown relatively
large  in some developing  countries  where,  paradoxically,  the public  sector  is
considered  superior,  and  vice  versa.
In contrast,  I argue  that  the  seemingly  random  variation  across  countries
within  a  given  educational level  and  stage  of  development is  due  to
differentiated  demand and nonprofit supply, steiming  mainly from cultural
heterogeneity,  especially religious heterogeneity.  On  the  demand side,
differentiated  tastes  about  ideology  lead  people  voluntarily  to opt  out  of the
public  system  even  when space  is  available,  to secure  the  kind  of  education  they
prefer.  On the supply  side,  private  schools  are  a  convenient  institution  for
diverse  non-prof  it-maximizing  religious  organizations  to  use  in  their  competition
for  a larger  market  share  of "souls."
Part  I  develops  the  conceptual  framework  for  analyzing  private  sector
size  and  public  spending  on  education. Part  II  presents  the  empirical  results,
using both a recursive  model in which public spending  is regarded  as pre-
cetermined  and a simultaneous  model in which size of the private sector  and
educational  spending  in  the  public  sector  are  jointly  determined.  The  recursive
and  simultaneous  models  lead  to  similar  conclusions.  Based  on  this  sample  of  50
developed and developing  countries (all the countries for which data are
available  on  private  enrollments  plus  the  most  important  explanatory  variables),
it  appears  that,  if  one  knows  the  answers  to  a  few  key  questions  about  a  society,
one  can  make a reasonably  good  prediction  about  the  size  of its  private  versus-3-
public educational  sectors.  Moreover,  the predictive  model is the same for
developed  and developing  countries,  despite the large differences  in their
private  sector  size.
But  first,  a  caveat: the  definition  of "private"  is  by  no  means  clear-cut
in  a situation  where  many "private"  schools  are  heavily  funded  and  regulated  by
the  state. In  most  developing  countries  private  schools  depend  mainly  on  private
funding,  but in  many developed  countries  subsidies  cover  a large  proportion  of
total expenses,  and government  control  over hiring and firing  of teachers,
salaries  and  student  admissions  criteria  accompany  these  subsidies. "Source  of
funding"  and "decision-making  authority"  then yield different  puLlic-private
categories  and  many  mixed  rather  than  polar  cases. In  this  paper  private  schools
are defined  as those  which had private  founders  and continue  to have private
management,  although  varying  amounts  of public  funding  may  be present.'
I.  Conceptual  Framework
Basic  Model
This  section  sets  forth  a  theory  in  which  the  relative  size  of the  private
educational  sector in a country (ZPVT) depends on its excess demand and
differentiated  demand  for education,  its  supply  of nonprofit  entrepreneurship,
and government  policies  that influence  public  and  private  supply.
Demand. Consider  a family  utility  function  in  which:
Ui  - Ui(QPUBi,  QPVTi,  EXTQi,  Yi  - Ti  - PQPVTi)  (I)
That  is, fismily  welfare  depends  on its own publie  and private  education
(QPUBi  and QPVTi), other  peoples'  consumption  of education  (EXTQi)t  and its
disposable  income  to  purchase  other  goods  after  paying  taxes  and  private  school
tuition  (Yi  - Ti - PQPVTi).  We assume  here  that  public  education  is  financed  out-4-
of taxes and uses non-price  rationing,  while private education  finances  and
rations,  at  least  partially,  on  the  basis  of  price. We are  examining  the  choice,
aggregated  over  all  families,  of QPUB±  versus  QPVTi,  for  a given  Y 1,  T1 and  P,  as
well as  the  collective  choice  of  public  educational  spending  which  influences  T.
As  a  first  step,  the  family  formulates  its  optimal  consumption  of  public  and
private  education,  QPUB*i  and  QPVT*i.  If  public  and  private  schools  are  perfect
substitutes  and  P >  0,  QPVT*i  - 0.  However,  the  supply  of public  places  may be
less  than  demand  so  some  people  are  excluded,  i.e.  actual  QPVSi  <  QPUB*i  for  some
i.  Then,  if  the  private  benefits  from  education  perceived  by family  i are  high
enough  to cover  the  price  of private  education  (e.g.  because  family  i's income
is  high),  they  will  seek  places  in  the  private  sector,  as  a  second-best  solution.
I  call  this  demand,  stemming  from  families  who  would  have  preferred  to  enter  the
free  or  low-price  public  system,  the  excess  demand  motive  for  private  education.
(See  Weisbrod,  1975  and  1977,  for  one  of  the  earliest  formulations  of  the  excess
demand  hypothesis). Excess  demand  existed in many Western countries  in the
nineteenth  century,  before  public  systems  became  open access. I argue  that  it
also  exists  in  many  developing  countries  today,  and  constitutes  the  major  reason
for  large  private  sectors  at the  secondary  and  higher  levels. 2 The greater  the
total  effective  demand  for  education  and  the  smaller  the  capacity  of  the  public
sector,  the larger  will be the excess  demand  for private education,  ceteris
paribus.
Now suppose that public and private  schools are imperfect  substitutes,
because  people  have  diverse  tastes  about  the  kind  of education  to be consumed,
but the public  system  is constrained  to be relatively  uniform.  If family  i
prefers  to enter  the  private  sector,  QPUB*i  - 0.  I call this  demand,  stemming
from  people  who prefer  the  product  variety  offered  in the  private  sector,  the- 5 -
differentiated  demand  for private  education.  Preliminary  evidence  from  many
countries  indicates  that  mu-..  of  this  taste  differentiation  stems  from  religious,
linguistic  and  nationality  differences  that  concern  group  identification.
3 The
greater  the cultural  heterogeneity  of the  population  and the  more uniform  the
public  educational  system,  the larger  will be the differentiated  demand for
private  education,  both in developed  and  developing  countries.
Differential  preferences  about  quality  can  also  lead  to  the  development  of
private  schools. In  particular,  a low  quality  public  system  may stimulate  the
growth  of  a  high  quality  private  sector,  meeting  the  demand  of  those  willing  and
able to  pay  the  price. If  we assume  that  educational  quality  has  a high income
elasticity  of  demand  and  if  the  public  sector  provides  a quality  level  that  just
satisfies  the median family,  greater income  diversity  within the population
implies  greater  dissatisfaction  among  upper  income  people,  who  will  seek  superior
education  in the  private  market.  4
Private  supRlv. Of  course,  the  ability  of  people  who  are  dissatisfied  with
the  amount  or type  of public  provision  to find  private  alternatives  depends  on
the supply  behavior  of private schools.  This paper does not seek to fully
explain  this behavior  but does analyze  one important  determinant  --  the role
played by  the nonprofit sector in education.  Private schools are often
established  as nonprofit organizations,  i.e. as organizations  that cannot
distribute  dividends  or stcck that can be sold for capital  gains.  Indeed,
nonprofit status is legally required for educational  institutions  in many
countries,  in part because  nonprofits  are considered  more "trustworthy"  (see
James  and  Rose-Ackerman,  1986).  This  characteristic  greatly  influences  the
supply of private  schools. For  example,  private  schools  may  not  spring  up even
though  a  potential  profit  exists,  because  there  is  no  pecuniary  return  on equity- 6 -
and  non-profit-motivated  capital  and  entrepreneurship  are  not  available.  On the
other  hand,  nonprofit  schools  may  spring  up  in  situations  where  for-profi,s  could
not break even,  because  of their  nonpecuniary  goals and lower  monetary  cost
functions  due  to donated  capital,  volunteer  labor  and  tax  advantages. We must
therefore  asks  what are  the  motives  of people  who start  nonprofit  schools  and
what factore  determine  their  availability?
I argue that  most founders  of private  nonprofit  schools  are ideol.ogical
organizations,  especially  religious  organizations.  (See  James  and  Rose-Ackerman,
1986,  for  a  fuller  development  of this  point.) Proselytizing  religions  such  as
Christianity  have  historically  used schools  as  a  mechanism  for  shaping  values,
socializing  old members and attracting  new  ones; the Catholic Church has
traditionally  run  its  own  school  system  around  the  world  with these  objectives.
And competing  ideologies  have  often  been forced  to start  their  awn  schools,  as
a  defensive  strategy. 5 The nonprofit  form is used because  these founders  are
interested  in maximizing  membership  or faith rather  than pecuniary  profits.
Therefore,  for reasons  of nonprofit  supply  as  well as differentiated  demand,  I
would  expect  the  private  educational  sector  to be larger  in  countries  with  many
strong  independent  religious  organizations  competing  Alor  members and member
loyalty,  through  their  schools.
Government  golicies.  Finally,  it should  be clear that  many government
policies  influence  the  demand  for  and  supply  of  private  schools. For  example,
governments  can and have prohibited  private schools or have imposed  costly
requirements  that have  a similar  effect  (e.g.,  Catholic  schools  were strongly
restricted  in  England  and  Holland  during  the  eighteenth  century,  private  schools
were  outlawed in Tanzania and  Pakistan during the  1970., and  extensive
regulations  deterred private school entrepreneurship  in  Sweden until very-7-
recently).  Governments  have required  nonprofit  status  of private schools  or
given  tax  privileges  to  nonprofit  schools  (the  U.S.  and  Japan  are  two  examples).
Some  governments  (e.g.  the  U.S.  and  Switzerland)  allow  local  control  over  public
schools,  which  should  increase  diversity  within  the  public  sector,  hence  diminish
the  differentiated  demand  for  private  schools.
It is  very difficult  to secure  data  on all  these  policies  for  the  entire
sample  of  countries.  However,  the  effects  of two  important  public  policies,  for
which  data could  be secured,  are  analyzed  in this  paper:  (1)  the  provision  of
subsidies  to  private  schools,  which increases  the  supply  of  private  education;
and (2)  government  spending  on public  schools,  which increases  their  quantity
and/or  quality  and  decreases  disposable  income,  hence  decreases  the  demand  for
private  education.
In sum, these  demand  and  supply  forces  are  hypothesized  to stem from  per
capita  income  (PCI),  stage  of development  (DV  and  ADV),  cultural  heterogeneity
(CULT  HET),  income  diversity  (INC  DIV),  public  educational  spending  (EDSP),  and
public  subsidies  to  private  education  (SUB). The reduced  form  equation  is:
Z  PVT  - f (PCI,  DV,  ADV, CULT  HET,  INC  DIV,  EDSP,  SUB]  (II)
Public  educational  seendina.  An imnediate  problem  concerns  the  endogeneity
of EDSP, which may be determined  by %PVT or by unobserved  forces  that also
influence  ZPVT. For  example,  people  who intend  to  opt  out  to  the  private  sector
may  push for  a low  spending  public  sector,  so the  effect  of  EDSP  on %PVT  may be
biased in a negative  direction  by OLS.  Conversely,  an unobserved  taste for
education  may lead  both to  a large  public  and  private  sector,  in  which  case  the
public  spending  effect  on  ZPVT  would  be  biased  in  a  positive  direction. To deal
with  these  problems  in  the  estimation  of  %PVT,  I  also  develop  a model  determining
EDSP  and  compare  the  predictions  of the  recursive  and simultaneous  models.More specifically,  I assume:
EDSP  - g(SEC,  DV,  PCIs  AGO-14,  TOT,  GOVSP,  ZPVT)  (III)
where AGO-14 - proportion  of the population  aged 0-14, TOT - an index of
totalitarian  control,  GOVSP  - non-educational  public  spending  as  a  proportion  of
GDP, and %PVT is included  in the simultaneous  model.  The next two sections
describe  the  key  variables  in the  private  sector  equation  (II)  and  provide  the
rationale  for the collective  choice  about  public spending  in equation  (III).
(See  Appendix  A for  definition  of variables  and  data  sources).
Rev  Variables  in  the Private  Sector  Equation
Per caDita income  and stage of develoDment.  DV and ADV are used to
represent  developing  and advanced  industrial  societies,  respectively,  and  per
capita  income  (PCI)  picks up smaller  income  differences  within each stage of
development. These  enter  into  equations  II and  III  as indicators  of the  gross
demand  for  education  and  the  effective  demand  for  differentiated  education. If
EDSP  does  not  change  in  the  course  of  economic  growth,  PCI  would  have  a  positive
effect,  DV a negative  effect  on  %PVT  and  the  interactions  of  heterogeneity  with
ADV  would  be  positive  in  equation  II.  However,  if EDSP  increases  with  economic
growth  in equation  III,  this  would  have  the  opposite  effect,  so the  net impact
of growth  on %PVT is ambiguous  a priori  and the regression  results  may vary
depending  on  whether  or  not  EDSP is  controlled.  One  object  of this  paper  is  to
examine  this  process,  as it throws  light  on the  relatively  greater  role  of the
private  sector  at the  secondary  level  in  developing  countries.
Cultural  heteroaeneitv.  Cultural  heterogeneity  enters  into  equation  II  as
the major determinant  of differentiated  demand for and nonprofit supply  of
private education.  To measure this, I secured  the religious  and linguistic
breakdown  of  the  populations  of all  the  countries  in  my sample;  indeed,  the  needfor  this  information  was the  major  factor  that  limited  the  sample  size.
I started  with a meaoure of religious  heterogeneity  which weights all
religions  equally: RELIG  - SKt  ln 1/R;,  where Ri - proportion  of the  population
constituted  by religion  i.  As the  number  of religions  grow,  so too  does  RELIG;
the  index  is  highest  where  the  population  is  equally  divided  among  a  large  number
of religions. 6
However,  some religions  are  much  more active  proselytizers  than others.
As noted  above,  Christianity  in  general  and  Catholicism  in  particular  have  done
so historically,  using schools  as a major  competitive  weapon, so I wanted  to
weight these groups more heavily in my  "religious  competition"  index.  I
consequently  constructed  a "Christian"  weight,  WTCH  - RCH or (I-RcH),  whichever
is  smaller,  and  similarly,  a  Catholic  weight,  WTcA  - RCA  or (I-RcA),  whichever  is
smaller.  These  weights  increase  as  RCH  (or  RCA)  increase  until  R - .5  is  reached,
after which they decrease; the weights are maximized when Christians (and
Catholics)  are  a large  minority  or a small  majority,  the situation  where  their
need  to  use  schools  as  a  competitive  instrument  is  maximized.  Therefore  my  index
of religious  heterogeneity  and religious  competition  is REL - WTCH  WTCA  ZR;  ln
1/1R.  Both  for  demand  and  supply  side  reasons  it  is  predicted  to  have  a  positive
effect  on ZPVT.
Linguistic  heterogeneity,  LANG,  was  measured  parallel  to  RELIG,  as EL;  ln
1/L*,  where  Li  - proportion  of  the  population  speaking  language  i.  Language  may
also serve  as a proxy  for  more general  cultural  heterogeneity  (e.g.,  based  on
nationality  or ethnicity)  and  as such  its  effect  is expected  to be positive.
Income  Distribution. Comparable  data on income  distribution  over large
sets of countries are exceedingly  difficult to find.  I used the "Gini
coefficient  of sectoral  inequality"  (GINI)  which  is  based  on  product  per  worker- 10  -
across economic sectors.  This index takes on larger values if product
proportions  are smaller  than labor proportions  for some sectors,  indicating
inter-sectoral  inequality.  Since  it  is  calculated  on  the  basis  of  large  economic
sectors  rather  than individuals  or households  it understates  total  inequality
and,  more importantly,  distorts  the  relative  inequality  positions  of different
countries. As an alternative,  I also used the proportion  of national  income
received  by the  bottom  20%  of households  (DISTRIB),  which  is inversely  related
to individual  inequality;  however,  such  measures  are known to be unreliable.
Although  inequality  is  predicted  to  have  a  positive  sign  on  theoretical  grounds
given  above,  it is  not  clear  whether  these  indices  will be capable  of  detecting
that  effect.
Subsidies. Most  countries  subsidize  their  private  schools  in  some  way  but
detailed  data are generally  not available  and the existence  of implicit  tax
subsidies  further  complicates  the  situation.  Given  this  paucity  of  data,  a  dummy
variable, SUB, is included  for those countries (mostly  advanced  industrial
societies)  that  cover  more  than  70%  of  the  costs  of  their  private  schools  out  of
public  funds.
Public  Educational  Spending. Many  developing  countries  restrict  access  to
their public systems at the secondary and higher levels, using non-price
mechanisms  to  ration  the  limited  number  of  places  among  the  excess  demanders,  and
this  capacity  constraint  can  clearly  be relaxed  by additional  spending  (EDSP).
EDSP  may also proxy  public  school  quality  (in  which  case  a low  EDSP leads  to a
differentiated  demand for private school quality)  but this relationship  is
ambiguous  (see  Hanushek,  1986). In  this  paper  EDSP  is  expressed  as  a  proportion
of GDP and  measures  differences  across  societies  in their  share  of GDP  devoted
to public  educational  finance. It is  measured  separately  for the  primary  and- 17 -
secondary  levels  and is expected  to have a negative  effect  on %PVT.'  Public
educational  spending  is treated  as  pre-determined  in  equations  (1-3),  while  its
determination  is simultaneously  modelled  in equation  (4),  Tables  2 and  3.
Collective  Choice  About  EDSP
To  fix  ideas about the  EDSP choice, let us  suppose that only two
alternatives  are  available--low  public  spending  (EDSPL),  which  will provide  a
public  school  system large  enough  to accommodate  only a minority  of the age
cohort  and  high  public  spending  (EDSPm),  which  ¶11  accommodate  a  majority.  I
assume  that  EDSP is financed  by taxes,  TLX  or Ts, in which everyone  knows  his
share  in advance,  and is determined  by a collective  choice  process  in  which:
1. If  public  provision  is  the  only  option  (i.e.  QPVT  is  required  to  be  0),
families  will be  willing  to expand  EDSP  ao long  as their  marginal  (private  and
external)  benefits  exceed  their  marginal  (tax)  costs;  and
2. Given  a  private  alternative  (i.e.,  QPVT  can  be  - or  > 0),  families  will
additionally  compare  the  net benefits  to them  of high  public  spending  (EDSP)
versus  low  public  spending  (EDSPW)  plus  optimal  QPVT  at EDSPL,  and  will choose
to expand  public educational  spending  if and only if they derive a greater
"consumer  surplus"  from  the  former. 8
Referring  back  to equation  (I),  it is  clear  that  families  favoring  EDSP
(who I  call  Group HI)  are  those who  will  thereby receive a  positive
redistribution  because  their  probable  benefits  are  greater  and/or  their  costs  are
lower  than  under  EDSPL due  to a  combination  of the  following  factors:
1. Their  tax  share  is low,  possibly  because  their  taxable  income  is  low;
2. Their  desired  consumption  of  public  schooling  is  high  because  they  have
school-age  children  who  want  to  attend,  they  perceive  a  high  return  to  education,- 12 -
and  they  do  not  have  a strong  preference  (on  quality  or ideological  grounds)  for
private  schooling;
3.  Their  probability  of being admitted  to the  marginal  public school
places  is high;
4. The  external  benefit  they  will  derive  from  the  educational  consumption
of others  is high and is  more easily  achieved  through  the  public  sector  where
their tax share is matched by the tax share of others; in some cases this
externality  may depend  on  public  control  over  detailed  school  decisions  such  as
the  beliefs  and  values  that  are  imparted  by schools. 9
On the  other  hand,  families  favoring  EDSPL (Group  LO)  are  those  who  will
be "redistributed  away from"  by EDSPW for  the  opposite  reasons. In this  paper
I do  not specify the collective  decision  process (e.g.,  I do not assume a
majority  voting  scheme)  but  I  do assume  that  as the  relative  size  and  political
power  of Group  HI increases,  the likelihood  of EDSPH  also increases,  and  vice
versa. 10 Therefore,  the key  variables  hypothesized  to determine  EDSP in the
recursive  model  are  PCI,  DV,  the  proportion  of  the  population  aged  0-14  (AGO-14),
an  index  of totalitarian  control  (TOT),  and  non-educational  government  spending
(GOVSP);  in the  simultaneous  model,  %PVT is added.
AGO-14  is  a proxy  for  effective  demand,  which  is  expected  to raise  desired
public  school  expenditures  at  the  primary  level  (particularly  for  large  families
whose tax share  is below  the  private  school  price for  multiple  children),  but
which  may  not  raise  desired  EDSP  at the  secondary  level,  because  of the  family's
quantity-quality  trade-off.  TOT  is a  "totalitarian  index," evidence of
dictatorial  power  that  may  have  a  positive  or negative  effect  on  EDSP  depending
on  whether  the  dictator  is  trying  to  maximize  the  utility  of Group  HI or Group
LO (i.e.,  is  a  populist  or  elitist  dictator)  and  whether  he  wishes  to  use  schools- 13 -
as an instrument  for tightening  his control." 1 GOVSP captures  the fact that
some  countries  use  public  rather  than  private  spending  to  finance  other  services;
if the  same  group  will  benefit  from  public  educational  spending,  this  indicates
they  probably  have the  motivation  and political  power  to enforce  a high  EDSP.
%PVT is  expected  to have a negative  effect  if people  who anticipate  that they
will attend the private system  are in Group LO, ceteris  paribus.  ZPVT is
obviously  endogenous  so 2SLS is  used in the  equations  where it is included.
II.  Empirical  Results
Methodologv
The  analysis  was conducted  by pooling  data  from  the  primary  and  secondary
levels  in  12  developed  and  38  developing  countries,  100  observations  altogether--
the largeet  number  for  which I could  get data on ZPVT and the  most essential
independent  variables.  My unit of analysis  was the country,  by educational
level. Although  the  sample  was  not  random  it  also  was  not  biased  in  any  obvious
way and includes  a wide variation in all variables as well as substantial
representation  from  all  geographic  areas. To ensure  that  influential  outliers
were  not strongly  influencing  my results  in this  small  sample,  I also reran  my
regressions  omitting  the observations  with the 6 highest  and 6 lowest  ZPVT.
While their omission  affected  the magnitude  of the coefficients,  it did not
change  their  signs  or the  pattern  of significant  results.
In  estimating  %PVT  a  linear  probability  model  and  logit  analysis  were  both
used,  and  yielded  very similar  conclusions. The  former  has  the  advantage  that
the  coefficients  are  easier  to interpret  but it has the  disadvantage  that  the
predicted  value  of ZPVT  may turn  out  to  be  >1  or  <0 for  some  countries;  however,
this  was not a big  problem  since  it only  occurred  in two  or three  cases  in all
my regressions,  and  by very small  amounts. Logit  has the potentially  greater- 14  -
disadvantage  that the  estimated  parameters  are sensitive  to small  measurement
errors  if %PVT is close to 0 or 1,  which holds  for several  countries  in this
study,  and it assumes  a smaller  marginal  effect  at extreme  values  of ZPVT than
in  the  middle  range,  which  may  be  a  misspecification.  Since  both  methods  yielded
very similar  conclusions,  the linear  probability  results  are  presented  in this
paper  and the  logit  results  are  available  upon request.
Determination  of %PVT  in a Recursive  Model
Table  2 presents  the  OLS and  2SLS results  for  ZPVT;  the first  3 columns
assume  a recursive  model  in  which  EDSP influences  %PVT  and  not  vice  versa;  the
last  column  uses a simultaneous  model  and is  discussed  in a later  section.
Equation  (1)  sets  forth  a  simple  model,  based  on the  most  clearly  exogenous
variables,  in  which  ZPVT  depends  on  stage  of  development  (DV,  SECDV),  per  capita
income (PCI),  level of education  (SEC),  and heterogeneity  (REL,  LANG, GINI,
separately  and  interacted  with  ADV). This  equation  was  designed  to test  whether
heterogeneity  is as important  as expected  on theoretical  grounds  (it is), to
ascertain  whether it has different  effects  in advanced (ADV)  and developing
countries  (it  doesn't),  and  to capture  the  systematically  larger  private  sector
at  the  secondary  level  in  developing  countries--as  in  the  coefficient  of 11.8  on
SECDV (the  secondary-developing  interaction  term).
I hypothesized  above that this difference  stems  mainly from an excess
demand  for  quantity  in  developing  countries,  and  this  depends  on  public  policies,
particularly  public  educational  spending.  Therefore,  equation  (2)  adds  EDSP  (and
SUB) to the  model.  As expected,  SUB  has  a positive  and  EDSP a strong  negative
effect.  More important,  the inclusion  of EDSP causes  the SECDV coefficient
virtually  to disappear.
Equation (3) presents a  more  parsimonious  version of  this model,- 15  -
eliminating  the  stage  of development  variables  which have  become  redundant  and
focusing  on the  heterogeneity  and  policy  variables  which,  both  on a  priori  and
ex poet  grounds,  are  most important.
Several  conclusions  can  be drawn  from  these  simple  recursive  equations:
1.  On  the basis of  a  few variables, which proxy  excess demand,
differentiated  demand,  nonprofit  entrepreneurship  and  relevant  public  policies,
we are  able  to  explain  over  half  the  variation  in  percentage  of enrollments  that
are  private.
2.  The most important  explanatory  factor is cultural  heterogeneity,
particularly  religious  heterogeneity. REL is always  significant  at the .1Z
level;  if  REL  increases  by I  standard  deviation,  ZPVT  increases  by 11  percentage
points. This  effect  holds  both  for  developing  countries  and  advanced  industrial
societies,  equally at the primary and secondary levels, 12 evidence of the
importance  of religious  entrepreneurship  in  private  education. LANG,  too,  has
a  positive  effect,  although  somewhat  w.aker.
3. Income  diversity  (GINI),  on  the  other  hand,  has  an  insignificant  effect-
-possibly  because  of the  data  problems  discussed  above. When I  measured  income
diversity  by DISTRIB instead  of GINI it also had an insignificant  effect.
Nevertheless,  if  we remove  the  heterogeneity  variables  as  a group  from  equation
(3),  the  R2 falls  from  52Z  to 27Z,  evidence  of their  key role.
4.  Although  basic cultural  factors  thus matter a great deal, public
policies  are also important.  For example,  SUB increases  ZPVT ten  percentage
p&'nts, despite its crudeness  as a variable.  This effect is particularly
important  in developed  countries,  where  mean SUB is  higher.
5.  More important,  once  public  educational  spending  enters  the  equation
(equ.3),  the  large  difference  between  developed  and  developing  countries  in  ZPVT- 16 -
at the secondary level disappears.  The  F  test shows that the stage of
development  variables  (including  their  interaction  terms)  become  insignificant,
both individually  and jointly [F(6,86)-1.15).  That is, the same explanatory
factors  work for developed  and developing  countries;  the large  difference  in
private  sector  size  at  the  secondary  level  is  due  almost  completely  to  the  large
difference  in public  secondary  education  spending.
On average,  both  sets  of  countries  in  my sample  spend  about  1.6%  of their
GDP  on  public  education  at the  primary  level. The  advanced  industrial  societies
spend  more than  that--2%--at  the  secondary  level,  where the  technological  cost
requirements  are  higher. But  the  developing  countries  spend  only .9%  of their
GDP  on  public  secondary  education,  thereby  eating  an  excess  demand  for  quantity
(and/or  a differentiated  demand  for  quality). If secondary  EDSP in  developing
countries  were increased  by 1.1 percentage  points (i.e.,  to the developing
country  mean),  equations  (2)  and (3)  tell  us that  ZPVT  would  fall  9-10,t  roughly
to parity  with ZPVT in  advanced  industrial  societies.
Determination  of Public  Educational  Sbending
However, these results  may be biased, if EDSP is really endogenous.
Therefore,  this section  deals  with the estimation  of EDSP and the following
section  explores  the  simultaneous  determination  of EDSP  and ZPVT.
Column  (1),  Table  3,  presents  a  simple  OLS  version  of  equation  III  designed
to capture some of the most important  variables influencing  EDSP and, in
particular,  to  reproduce  the  low  level  of  educational  spending  at the  secondary
level in developing  countries. To be consistent  with the recursive  model in
columns  (1)-(3),  Table  2,  ZPVT  is  omitted  from  this  equation. As expected,  SEC,
PCI, AGO-14 and GOVSP have positive effects.  TOT has a negative effect,
consistent  with a  model  of elitist  dictatorial  control." Stage  of development- 17  -
has virtually no effect at the primary level but SECDV has a significant
coefficient  of -1,  thereby  almost  fully  accounting  for  the fact that the  mean
EDSP at the secondary  level in developing  countries  is 1.1% of GDP lower  in
developed  than  in developing  countries.
Column  (2)  seeks  to  explain  where  this  large  SECDV  effect  on  EDSP  is  coming
from. I  conjectured  above  that  a  high  proportion  of  school-age  children  (AGO-14)
might have different  effects at the primary and secondary  levels, since it
involves  a  quantity-quality  trade-off.  Large  families,  especially  those  with  low
incomes,  might  have  a  high  desired  consumption  of  public  education  at  the  primary
level to make their  children  literate,  but a low desired  consumption  at the
secondary  level  because  of a limited  willingness  to invest  in each child  and
because  their  demand  for  other  goods  is  more  pressing.'4  Moreover,  high  income,
high taxpaying  families  might  be willing  to subsidize  the  primary  education  of
children  from  large  poor  families  because  they  perceive  externalities  from  having
a  literate  citizenry  with the "right"  values and habits,  but their external
benefits  and  willingness  to subsidize  secondary  education  might  be much lower,
since  that  would facilitate  labor  market  competition  with their  own children.
Thus,  while  the  high  AGO-14  in  developing  countries  increases  the  size  of  Group
HI and  EDSP at the  primary  level,  it  may not  have this  effect  at the secondary
level. To test  whether  this  is  the  case,  equation  (2)  adds  an  AGO-14*Secondary
interaction  term. As expected,  this  has  a  negative  effect  and  almost  completely
dissipates  the separate  effect  of SECDV.
Finally,  equation  (3)  presents  a  more  parsimonious  version  of this  model,
omitting  SECDV  and  DV,  which  are  now redundant  and,  with no loss  of  explanatory
power,  focuses  on the  remaining  important  variables--SEC,  PCI, GOVSP,  TOT, and
AGO-14.  In all,  442  of the  variance  of EDSP is explained  by these  variables.- 18  -
Simultaneous  versus  Recursive  Determination  of EDSP and  %PVT
Equation (4) in Tables 2  and 3  present the  2SLS version of this
simultaneous  model,  based  on  the  equations  in  column  (3),  with  %PVT  added  to  the
EDSP  equation.  The  equations are  identified by  the  exclusion of  the
heterogeneity  variables  and  SUB from the  EDSP equation,  AGO-14,  GOVSP and TOT
from the %PVT equation.  Our  results are virtually unchanged.  Cultural
heterogeneity  remains  the  main  determinant  of  %PVT  for  all  educational  levels  and
country  groups,  and  EDSP is  the  second  most important  variable  in  Table  2,  while
AGO-14  and  AGO-14wSEC  play a key  role in  Table  3.
%PVT is  never  close  to  significance  as a  determinant  of EDSP.  The  reason
may  be that when high cultural heterogeneity  leads to a  high %PVT, this
diminishes the  private benefit of  public educational spending among the
minorities  but  increases  the  external  benefit  among  the  dominant  group,  who  want
to  use  the  public  schools  as  a  means  of  inculcating  a  common  language  and  values
(see fn 9).  The net effect  on the relative  size of Groups  I and II and the
equilibrium  EDSP  ie therefore  negligible. Thus  it  appears  that  EDSP influences
ZPVT  but  not  vice  versa;  and  the  recursive  OLS  model  of %PVT  discussed  earlier
does  not lead  one  astray.
To  recapitulate  how  this  model  works  let  us  compare  the  derivation  of  EDSP
and  %PVT  for  an  "average"  developing  country  at  the  primary  and  secondary  levels,
respectively. Its low  per  capita  income  and  government  spending  combined  with
its  high  totalitarian  index,  lead  it  to  choose  a  low  EDSP;  this  is  offset  at the
primary but not the secondary level by  its high proportion  of school-age
children. Thus  this  country  ends  up  with  high  public  educational  spending  at  the
primary  level,  much  like  that  in  developed  countries,  but  relatively  low  public
spending,  hence  a small  public  sector,  at the  secondary  level.- 19 -
At the same time, many people  who are excluded  from the small public
secondary  sector  perceive  benefits  from  education  that  exceed  its  priv.te  price.
This includes  (1)  high  income,  high tax  share  families  from  Group  LO  who  prefer
private  education  for  their  children;  (2)  high tax  share  families  from  Group  LO
who want a small  public  sector  but  would  be  willing  to  use it if admitted;  and
(3)  some low  income  families  from  Group  HI (i.e.,  those  who chose  quality  over
quantity  of children)  who want a  large public sector  but, having lost the
collective  choice Dattle,  now exercise  their  personal  choice in the private
market.  Table 2 shows that the low level of public secondary  spending  in
developing  countries  greatly  increases  the  excluded  students  from  the  latter  two
categories  and hence their excess  demand for private education,  as a second
choice.
The Political  Economy  of Public-Private  Choices
At this  point  one  might  ask: Why  are  people  not  willing  to  spend  publicly,
if  they  are  willing  to spend  privately,  in  excess-demand-drive  private  sectors?
If the  real  cost  of  a  private  school  place  equals  that  of  a  public  school  place
and if private  enrollments  are, on average,  31%  of the  total  at the secondary
level  in  developing  countries,  it  follows  that  private  spending  augments  public
spending  by 45%. If  people  are  not  willing  to spend  more in the  public  sector,
why are  they  willing  to spend  so  much in the  private  sector?
Part of the answer  is that costs  per student  are  generally  lower  in the
private  sector.  (See  James,  1991a;  James  and Benjamin,  1988;  Levy, 1986;  and
Jimenez,  Lockheed,  Luna  and  Paqueo,  1991). If low  costs  lead  to low  price  in  a
private  competitive  market,  this  increases  the  number  of families  who  will favor
low  public  spending,  even  though  they  value education.
But  the  more  basic  reason  is  that  the  distributional  consequences  of  public- 20 -
and  private  spending  differ  when taxes  are  not  based  on  benefits. To see  this,
suppose  that  a country  has chosen  EDSPw' TLW (i.e.,  Group  LO has  prevailed)  and
consider  a low-tax  share,  high-benefit  member  of Group  HI who is  excluded  from
the  public  schools. That family  will  purchase  education  in  the  private  market.
We know (by  its  membership  in Group  HI) that this  family  would  have preferred
EDSPe, T0, where its total costs  would have been lower and/or  its benefits
higher  (i.e.,  it would have received  a positive  redistribution). But it  was
outvoted  by families  in  Group  LO,  whose  marginal  tax  costs  would  have  exceeded
their  marginal  benefits  if the public  system  expanded  (i.e.,  they  would have
received  a  negative  redistribution).  Group  LO apparently  could  not  raise  Group
HI's tax share  to match its benefits,  but it could  successfully  impose  a  low
EDSP,  thereby  forcing  Group  HI  to  spend  more  via  fees  in  the  private  sector. (Of
course, some members of Group HI will not spend  more and will not acquire
education,  as they  might  have in a larger  public  system). 1'
Thus,  if  an  equivalent  amount  of  public  spending  replaced  private  spending,
the  distribution  of costs  and  benefits  would  be quite  different. Consequently,
different  groups  will  favor  public  versus  private  spending. I  have  tried  to  show
why the size of Group  HI versus  Group  LO changes  over the course  of economic
development  due  to  demographic  change,  thereby  shifting  the  political  equilibrium
at the  secondary  level  from  EDSPL, Tf to EDSP",  T 3' and  eliminating  the  excess
demand  motive  for  private  educatiion. This  explains  why the  private  sector  at
the  secondary  level  is systematically  larger,  even  though  it  may be considered
inferior,  in developing  countries;  while  developed  countries  are  characterized
by a  larger  public  sector  and  a  correspondingly  smaller  private  sector,  based  on
differentiated  demand  rather  than  excess  demand.
Conclusion- 21 -
In summary,  I have asked  why different  societies  have made different
choices  about  their reliance  on public  versus  private  provision  of education.
The relative  size of the private sector  was modelled  as depending  on excess
demand,  differentiated  demand,  the supply  of nonprofit  entrepreneurship,  and
government  policies. I  hypothesized  that  excess  demand  stemming  from  low  public
spending  is the major explanation  for the systematically  larger  size of the
private sector  at  the  secondary level  in  developing countries, while
differentiated  demand and  nonprofit supply, both  stemming from  cultural
heterogeneity,  are  the  major  explanations  for  variations  in  private  sector  size
within  a given  stage  of development  and  educational  level.
Regression  analyses  conducted  across  a  pooled  primary-secondary  sample  of
50  countries  (100  observations)  produced  results  that  were  consistent  with these
hypotheses.  Religious  competition  and  entrepreneurship  have  highly  significant
positive  effects  in all  cases. Linguistic  heterogeneity  plays  a positive  (but
somewhat  lesser) role.  These findings  have important  implications  for the
behavior  of  private  schools. For  example,  they  suggest  that  private  schools  may
segment  the  population  along  religious,  linguistic,  nationality  or ideological
lines,  because  of the  motivations  of their  nonprofit  producers  and  consumers.
While basic  cultural  forces  thus  play a large  role,  public  policies  can
also  influence  the  size  and  nature  of  the  private  sector. In  particular,  public
educational  spending,  which  increases  the  capacity  (and  possibly  quality)  of the
public  system,  has  a  negative  effect  on  %PVT. Since  public  educational  spending
is  particularly  low  at the  secondary  level  in  developing  countries,  this  result
is consistent  with the excess  demand  explanation  for  the large  private  sector
there.  Once public educational  spending is taken into account, the same
predictive  model  works  for  developed  and  developing  countries,  despite  the  large- 22 -
differences  in  their  private  sector  size.
I also  modelled  the  collective  decision  process  that  determines  public
educational  spending. The  coalition  favoring  higher  public  spending  at the
secondary  level  is  predicted  to  increase  with  development,  due  to income  and
demographic  changes,  especially  the  decline  in  family  size.  As  the  public  sector
expands,  people  who  have  been  involuntarily  excluded  can  now  find  places,  so
excess-demand-driven  private  schools  are crowded  out.  According  to our
estimates,  this  process  ultimately  reduces  ZPVT  to  the  level  found  in  developed
countries,  which  is  explained  mainly  by  cultural  heterogeneity.  While  large
excess-demand-driven  private  sectors  can flourish  in countries  with  limited
public  systems  even  if  they  are  considered  inferior,  the  differentiated-demand-
driven  private  schools  that  survive  in  countries  with  open  access  public  systems
are  likely  to  be  considered  superior  (academically  or ideologically),  by the
revealed  preference  of  their  consumers.- 23 -
ENDNOTES
1. See  James (1991b),  for  a  more  detailed  discussion  of these  mixed  cases,  and
the  relationship  between  subsidies  and  regulations.
2.  Examples  are  Kenya  where the  majority  of secondary  school  enrollments  were
privately  founded,  Brazil  and  the  Philippines  where  80S of college  enrollments
are private.  Among industrialized  countries  currently,  Japan best fits the
"excess  demand"  model  at  both  the  secondary  and  higher  levels;  over  one-quarter
of all high school  - (upper  secondary)  students  and three quarters  of higher
education  students  attend  private  institutions,  mainly  because  of  limited  space
in  the  preferred  public  schools  and  universities.  See  James  (1986a  and 1991a);
James  and  Benjamin  (1988). Also see  West (1967  and 1970)  for  data on the  U.S.
and  U.K. in the  nineteenth  century.
3.  The many private schools and colleges that accommodate  religious or
linguistic  minorities (e.g.,  schools for Muslims, Parsees, Sikhs in India,
Chinese  and Indians in Malaysia)  are examples  of private sector  response  to
differentiated  demand. Among  Western  countries,  the  best  example  of  the  cultural
heterogeneity  model  is the  Netherlands,  where  two-thirds  of all  students  attend
privately  managed  schools,  a  response  to  the  pervasive  religious  cleavage  which
dominated  that country  at the  turn of the century. For other  examples  of the
importance  of cultural  heterogeneity  see  James (1984,  1986b,  and 1987).
4.  Two examples  are  Brazil  and  the  Philippines,  at the  secondary  level,  where
25 and 38Z of enrollments,  respectively,  are in private schools,  which are
generally  considered  to  be  better  than  public  secondary  schools. But  if  greater
income  diversity  means  that  upper  income  groups  also  control  the  government,  they
may use this power to choose  a public  system  that is high in quality,  low in- 24 -
quantity  and  rationed  to  them. In  that  case,  a  large  excess  demand  may  develop,
as at the higher  education  level  in Brazil  and the Philippines. Thus income
dispersion  is  predicted  to  lead  to  a  large  private  sector,  but  we cannot  be sure
a  priori  whether  this  will  be  due  to  excess  demand  for  quantity  or  differentiated
demand  for  quality.
5.  For example, the caste groups in Southern India and the independence
movements  in  India  and  Kenya  before  independence  started  their  own  schools,  with
the  expressed  intention  of  inculcating  their  own  values  and  keeping  their  members
out  of  the Western-dominated  Christian schools.  Other  examples of  the
ideological/religious  origin  of  private  nonprofit  schools  are  sectarian  schools
in  the  U.S.  and  U.K.,  schools  run  by  Catholic  orders  in  France  and  Latin  America,
Calvinist  schools  in Holland,  orthodox  Jewish schools  in Israel,  educational
services  provided  by Muslim  waqfs (religious  trusts)  in the  Middle  East  and  by
missionaries  in  many developing  countries.
6.  For a discussion  of the properties  of this index  see Theill (1972)  and
Allison  (1978). For  its  use in  an international  comparative  study  of  homicide
see Hansmann  and Quigley (1982).  Obviously,  this index is sensitive  to the
fineness  with which.  one disaggregates  various  religions. I used  all the sub-
categories  found in my data sources  which constituted  more than .1% of the
population,  including  "Other  Religions"  as a separate  category.
7.  The only eource  giving  education  financial  information  for large  sets of
countries  is  the  Unesco  Statistical  Yearbook. There  are  many  practical  problems
with these  data. They  often  give  planned  rather  than  actual  expenditures,  the7
sometimes  exclude  local  government  spending,  the  allocation  between  primary  and
secondary levels is admittedly  imprecise,  and in many cases they include
government  spending  in  public  schools  as well as subsid'.es  to private  schools.
The  number  of years  contained  in  the  primary  versus  the  secondary  cycle  varies
among  countries. To eliminate  the  bias this introduces  into spending  data  in- 25 -
cross-national  analyses,  I  calculated  an "expenditure  per  year"  for  each  country
and  multiplied  this  by a standard  6-year  dutation  at each level.
8. It  can  easily  be  shown  that  the  availability  of  a  private  alternative  reduces
the probability that families will  favor EDSPhi.  This  is,  of  course,
particularly true  for  families that have  strong ideological  or  quality
preferences  for  private  education.
9.  For example,  external  benefits  may stem only from schools  that instill  a
common  language  or  that  inculcate  values  such  as nationalism  or support  for  the
existing  political  regime.  The historical  literature  on the development  of
American  public  education  focuses  on  the  desire  of the  old-timers  to  control  the
language,  ideology  and  values  of  the  newcomers  to  the  "melting  pot"  as  one  of  the
major  motivating  forces  behind  increased  public  funding  and  management  of  schools
in  the  nineteenth  century,  particularly  in  the  Northeastern  part  of  the  country.
Control  over  the language  of instruction  has  also  been an important  object  of
public  educational  spending  in several  African  and  Asian  countries,  and  control
over political ideology  has been an impetus  to public spending  in Communist
countries.  Of course,  people  who  have  minority  beliefs  may  oppose  high  EDSP  and
may make contributions  to  private  schools  for  the  same  reason.
10. One  would  expect  public  spending  to  be highest  in  societies  where  political
power  is concentrated  in  Group  HI,  which  uses  EDSP  as  a  mechanism  for  achieving
a redistribution  of real income  from Group  LO.  For example,  in Malaysia  the
politically  dominant  Malays are redistributing  real income  from the wealthy
Chinese  and  Tamil  communities,  via  their  control  over  and  preferred  access  to  the
public  education  institutions,  especially  at the  higher  educational  level.
11. TOT  is  an index  of  political  and  civil  rights  as  coded  by Gastil,  published
by  Freedom House  and  reprinted in  Taylor and  Jodice  (1983).  I  used,
alternatively,  the 1975  score  and the  mean score  for 1972-78.  There  is very
little  difference  between  the  two  and  the  latter  are  given  in  Table  3. The  range- 26 -
in this index is from 2 (highest  political  liberty  and civil rights)  to 14
(highest  totalitarian  control).  See  Appendix  A  on  data  sources  for  more  details.
12. I tested  whether  heterogeneity  had  different  effects  at the  primary  and
secondary  levels  by interacting  REL,  LANG  and  GINI  with  SEC. The  interaction
terms  were  always  small  and  insignificant  and  their  inclusion  did  not  affect  the
other  variables.
13.  The  negative  coefficient  suggests  that  many  totalitarian  regimes  spend  less
on  public  education,  because  they  are  more  immune  to  popular  pressures.  In  this
respect,  my  results  are  contrary  to  those  of  Lott  (1990),  possibly  because  of  a
different  sample  and  a  different  variant  of  the  dependent  variable.
14. Many  such  families  cannot  afford  the  opportunity  cost  of  secondary  school.
Often  their  children  have  dropped  out  of  primary  school,  hence  are  not even
candidates  for  secondary  school.  They  may  believe  their  children  are  unlikely
to  be admitted  to a public  secondary  school. For  empirical  evidence  on the
quantity-quality  trade-off  and  the  negative  relationship  between  family  size  and
secondary  school  attendance  in  developing  countries  see  Knodel  (1990).
15. A similar  explanation  is  likely  to  hold  for  excess-demand-driven  higher
education  sectors.  For  a  closely  related  analysis  of  the  limited  public  spending
on  secondary  and  higher  education  in  Japan  see  James,  1986a,  James  and  Benjamin,
1988.TABLE 1:  RELAtIVE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE  SECTOR  IN EDUCATION
12  Advanced  Z Private  X  Private  S  Private  2  Private Industrial  Primary  Secondary  Primary  Secondary Societies  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Australia  20  26  Iran  8  17 Belgium  51  62  Jordan  30  7 Denmark  7  6  Morocco  5  8 England  & Wales*  22  16  Saudi  Arabia  3  2 France  15  21  Syria  5  6 Germany  2  9  Argentina  17  45 Italy  8  7  Bolivia  9  24 Japan  **  1  15  Brazil  13  25 Netherlands  69  72  Chile  18  23 New  Zealand  10  12  Colombia  15  38 Sweden  1  2  Costa  Rica  4  6 U. S.  10  9  Ecuador  17  30 Median  10  13.5  El Salvador  6  47 Mean  18.0  21.4  Guatemala  14  43
Haiti  42  76  M 38  Developing  Honduras  5  51 Countries  Jamaica  5  76
Mexico  6  25 Kenya  1  49  Panama  5  14 Lesotho  100  89  Paraguay  13  37 Sudan  2  13  Peru  13  37 Cameroon  43  57  Venezuela  13  17 Chad  10  6  India  25  52 Liberia  35  43  Indonesia  13  60 Niger  5  14  Philippines  5  38 Nigeria  26  41  Singapore  35  1 Togo  29  16  Thailand  11  32 Upper  Volta  7  43  Median  11  27.5 Algeria  1  1  Mean  16.1  31.3
*  These  numbers  include  both the  independent  and  voluntary  aided  sectors  in  the  U.K.
**  Data include  upper  and  lower  secondary. Figure  for  upper  secondary  is  281.
Mean ZPVT  - 22.71 (Mean %PVT - 16.52; %PVTSEC - 28.91)- 28  -
Table  2
Dependent  Variable: Proportion  of Enrollments
that  are  Private  (ZPVT)
_________  _  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
2
R2  .46  .56  .52  .52  __
C  27.2  38.4  19.9  21.6
_____________  _(2.07)'  (2.15)0  (3.37)'  (2.69)b
SEC  3.4  8.4  9.7  9.2
____________  (.56)  (1.48)  (2.78)  (2.44)  _
SEC*DV  11.8  1.4  - -
_____________  (1.66)d  (*19)  - -
DV  -15.4  -16.1  - -
(1.13)  (.97)  - -
PCI  -2.8  -1.5  -. 4  -. 3  2.0
_____________  (1.96)0C  (1.01)  (.45)  (.28)  (2.4)
REL  3.9  3.8  4.0  4.1  1.8
____________  !  (3.81)*  (4.99)'  (6.27)'  (6.41)'  (2.8)
LANG  5.2  4.3  6.3  6.4  .6
_____________  (1.51)  (1.4)  (2.04)0  (2.05)0  (.5)
GINI  -1.1  -. 3  -.8  -. 8  2.6
i  _________G  (.8)  (.27)  (.75)  (.7)  (1.6)
REL*ADV  .5  .4  - -
(.25)  (.27)  - -
LANG*ADV  13.1  16.1  - -
(.72)  (1.18)  - -
GINI*ADV  -7.0  -14.1  - -
(1.18)  (1.6)  _  _
SUB  8.4  10.2  10.1  .2 1  _________  (1.78)d  (2.24)0  (2.24)0  (.4)
EDSP  _  -9.1  -8.1  -9.6  1.4
(3.03)  (2.42)0  (1.72)  (.6)
Notes: Mean ZPVT  =  22.7;  (Mean  ZPVTPRI  - 16.5,  ZPVTSEC  - 28.9).
t statistics  are corrected  for  heteroscedasticity  using  White's  method. See
White,  H. (1978). "A Heteroscedasticity  Consistent  Covariance  Matrix  and  a
Direct  Text for  Heteroscedasticity,"  Econometrica,  817-838.
EDSPZ  was also  included  in all  equations  to denote  countries  where the
primary/secondary  division  of EDSP  was  missing  and  was imputed.
Significance  levels:
a - .1Z  Col. 1-3:  OLS
b - 12  4s  2SLS
c - 52  5:  Variable  means  and (standard
d - 101  deviations)- 29  -
Table  3
Dependent  Variable: Public  Educational  Spending
as a  Proportion  of GDP (EDSP)
________  - (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
.43  .44  .44  .41  _
C  -. 17  -.66  -.77  -1.01
____________  (.28)  (.97)  (1.24)  (1.46)
SEC  .38  1.36  1.54  1.58  _
____ __ __(1.86)d  (2.01)0  (3.55)'  (3.68)
SEC*DV  -1.0  -.21  - -
(4.23)'  (.36)  - -
DV  .23  -.16  - -
(.58)  (.35)  - -
PCI  .05  .05  .06  .08  2.0
-___  (.79)  (.78)  (1.15)  (1.36)  (2.4)
GOVSP  .02  .02  .02  .02  18.9
( 2 . 98 )b  ( 3 . 0 3)b  (3.25)  (3.83)0  (9.8)
TOT  -.03  -. 03  -.04  -. 03  7.7
(1.48)  (1.5)  (1.84)d  ( 1 . 6 7 )d  (3.9)
AGO-14  .03  .05  .05  .05  39.1
(2.19)*  (2.65)  (3.73)'  (3.83)*  (9.2)
AGO-14*SEC  _  -.04  -.05  -.05  _
______  __  __  (1.52)  (4.53)'  (4.66)0
ZPVT  _  .003  22.7
_  _  ~  (.74)  (21.5)
Notes:  EDSP - 1.4 (mean EDSPPRI - 1.6, EDSPSEC - 1.2)
EDSPZ  was also included  in all  equations  to denote  countries  where  the
primary/secondary  division  of  EDSP  was  missing  and  was imputed.
Significance  levels:
a - .1Z  Col. 1-3:  OLS
b - 1Z  4:  2SLS
c - 5  5:  Variable  means  and (standard
d - 101  deviations)- 30
Appendix  A
Symbols  and  Data Sources
PCI  - per  capita  income,  1975  in  thousands  of  U.S.  dollars,  World  Tables
(Washington,  D.C.:  World  Bank,  1988-89).  Foreign exchange
converted  to  U.S.  dollars  according  to  the  World  Bank  Atlas  method,
to  smooth the  impact of  temporary under or  over-evaluation.
(Purchasing  power  parity  figures  not  available  for  most countries
in sample).
REL  - an index  of religious  heterogeneity  - 100(WTA  WTc,gRln1/Rk)  where
R1 - proportion of  population constituted by  religion i.
Calculated  from data in Charles  L. Taylor  & Michael C. Hudson,
Cross-National  Aggregate  Data for  World  Handbook  of Political  and
Social  Indicators  (MRDF),  (Ann  Arbor:  Center  for  Political  Studies,
University  of  Michigan,  ICPSR,  1971);  and  H.W.  Coxill  & K. Grubb,
World  Christian  Handbook  (Nashville,  N.Y.:  Abingden  Press,  1968).
See  text for  discussion.
LANG  - an  index of  linguistic heterogeneity  - EL 1ln1/L 1 where  L, -
proportion  of  population  whose  main  language  is  i. Calculated  from
data in Charles  L. Taylor  & Michael  C. Hudson,  World Handbook  of
Political and Social Indicators  II, Section V, RaW Data File:
Fractionalization  and  Concentration  Measure  and  Inequality  Indices.
(Ann  Arbor:  University  of  Michigan,  1970).
GINI  - Sectoral  Gini,  based  on comparison  between  proportion  of product
coming  from  and  proportion  of labor  engaged  in each  sector  of the
economy. Data for  selected  years  in 1970s  from  Charles  L. Taylor
and David A.  Jodice, World Handbook of Political and  Social
Indicators  (New  Haven:  Yale  University  Press,  3rd  ed., 1983).
SUB  - Dummy  variable  of 1  for  countries  that  subsidized  more than  70Z  of
the  total  cost  of their  private  sectors  in 1975.- 31  -
TOT  - Index  of  political  and  civil  rights  as  coded  by  Raymond  D. Gastil
and  published  by Freedom  House. This  index  is  based  on criteria
such  as  the  existence  of  elections,  more  than  one  political  party,
local  governments,  an independent  judiciary  and free  media (press,
radio  &  TV). 1975  data  from  Freedom  at  Issue,  Freedom  House,  1976,
11-20. Mean scores  for 1972-78  from  Taylor  & Jodice,  op. cit.
Range  is  from  2 (highest  political  liberty  and  civil  rights)  to 14
(highest  totalitarian  control).
GOVSP  - Current  general (central  and local)  government  spending  minus
educational  spending,  as  Z  of  GDP,  1973. Taylor  &  Jodice,  op.  cit.
EDSP  - Current  educational  spending  on primary and secondary  levels,
respectively,  1975.  To control  for the fact that different
countries  have different  years'  duration  for the primary and
secondary  cycles,  I adjusted  all to a standard  6-year  duration.
Division  between  primary  and  secondary  imputed  for  Denmark,
Australia,  USA and  New Zealand.  Unesco  Statistical  Yearbook,  1980-
85.
AGO-14 - S  of population  age  0-14,  1975. World  Tables,  World  Bank  &  Johns
Hopkins  Press,  Vol.  II,  Social  Data,  1983.
SEC  - Dummy  taking  the  value  of 1  for  secondary  education.
DV  - Dummy  taking  the  value  of 1  for  developing  countries.
ADV  - Dummy  taking  the  value  of 1  for  advanced  industrial  societies.
%PVT  - Z  of  total  enrollments  that  were  in  private  schools,  selected  years
between 1975 and 1981, calculated  separately  for primary and
secondary  levels. Sources:
Sweden  (1978):  Marklund,  S.  (1979).  Educational  Administration  and  Educational
Development. Stockholm:  University  of Stockholm,  Institute  of International
Education.
Denmark  (1981): Communications  with  Ministry  of  Education,  Copenhagen.
Rest  of  EuroRe  (1980):  Neave,  G. (1985).  "The  non-state  sector  in  education  in
Europe:  A  conceptual  and  historical  analysis,"  Euronean  Journal  of  Education.  20,
321-337;  and Mason, P. (1983).  Private education  in the EEC.  London:
Independent  Schools  Information  Service.- 32 -
Australia  (1980):  Australlan  School  Statistics.  Canberra:  Commonwealth  Schools
Commission,  1984.
Japan (1980): Mombusho. Tokyo: Ministry  of Education,  1981.
New  Zealand  (1978): Educational  Statistics  of  New Zealand. Wellington: Dept.
of Education,  1978.
U.S.A.  (1980): Digest  of Educational  Statistics.  Washington,  D.C.:  National
Center  for  Educational  Statistices,  U.S. Dept.  of Education,  1982.
India  (1978):  Fourth  All-India  Educational  Survev. New  Delhi:  National  Council
of Educational  Research  and  Training,  1978.
Other  DeveloRing  Countries  (1975). FinanciLna  Education  in  Develoging  Countries.
Washington,  D.C.:  World  Bank,  1986.- 33  -
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